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Abstract. Recent studies have shown that DNNs can be compromised by back-
door attacks crafted at training time. A backdoor attack installs a backdoor into
the victim model by injecting a backdoor pattern into a small proportion of the
training data. At test time, the victim model behaves normally on clean test data,
yet consistently predicts a specific (likely incorrect) target class whenever the
backdoor pattern is present in a test example. While existing backdoor attacks are
effective, they are not stealthy. The modifications made on training data or labels
are often suspicious and can be easily detected by simple data filtering or hu-
man inspection. In this paper, we present a new type of backdoor attack inspired
by an important natural phenomenon: reflection. Using mathematical modeling
of physical reflection models, we propose reflection backdoor (Refool) to plant
reflections as backdoor into a victim model. We demonstrate on 3 computer vi-
sion tasks and 5 datasets that, Refool can attack state-of-the-art DNNs with high
success rate, and is resistant to state-of-the-art backdoor defenses.
Keywords: backdoor attack, natural reflection, deep neural networks
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are a family of powerful models that have been widely
adopted to achieve state-of-the-art performance on a variety of tasks in computer vi-
sion [23], machine translation [49] and speech recognition [20]. Despite great success,
DNNs have been found vulnerable to several attacks crafted at different stages of the
development pipeline: adversarial examples crafted at the test stage, and data poisoning
attacks and backdoor attacks crafted at the training stage. These attacks raise security
concerns for the development of DNNs in safety-critical scenarios such as face recog-
nition [45], autonomous driving [15,13], and medical diagnosis [17,38]. The study of
these attacks has thus become crucial for secure and robust deep learning.
One well-known test time attack is the construction of adversarial examples, which
appear imperceptibly different (to human eyes) from their original versions, yet can
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Fig. 1. Comparison of successful backdoor attacks. Our reflection backdoors (rightmost column)
are crafted based on the natural reflection phenomenon, thus need not to mislabel the poisoned
samples on purpose (A - D, mislabels are in red texts), nor rely on obvious patterns (A - C, E),
unpleasant blending (D), or suspicious stripes (F). Therefore, our reflection backdoor attacks are
stealthier. A [21]: black-white squares at the bottom right corner; B [9]: small image at the center;
C [52]: one malicious pixel; D [9]: a fixedly blended image; and E [53]: adversarial noise plus
black-white squares at the bottom right corner; F [3]: fixed and sinusoidal strips.
fool state-of-the-art DNNs with high success rate [19,50,57]. Adversarial examples can
be constructed against a wide range of DNNs, and remain effective even in physical
world scenarios [16,13]. Different from test-time attacks, training time attacks have
also been demonstrated to be possible. DNNs often require large amounts of training
data to achieve good performance. However, the collection process of large datasets
is error-prone and susceptible to untrusted sources. Thus, a malicious adversary may
poison a small number of training examples to corrupt the model, decreasing its test
accuracy. This type of attack is known as the data poisoning attack [5,28,47].
More recently, backdoor attacks (also known as Trojan attacks) [4,10,21,31,35,42,52,66]
highlight an even more sophisticated threat to DNNs. By altering a small set of training
examples, a backdoor attack can plant a backdoor into the victim model so as to control
the model’s behavior at test time [21]. Backdoor attacks arise when users download pre-
trained models from untrusted sources. Fig. 1 illustrates a few examples of successful
backdoor attacks by existing methods (A-F). A backdoor attack does not degrade the
model’s accuracy on normal test inputs, yet can control the model to make a predic-
tion (which is in the attacker’s interest) consistently for any test input that contains the
backdoor pattern. This means it is difficult to detect a backdoor attack by evaluating the
model’s performance on a clean holdout set.
There exist two types of backdoor attacks: 1) poison-label attack which also mod-
ifies the label to the target class [9,21,37,52], and 2) clean-label attack which does not
change the label [44,3,53,66]. Although poison-label attacks are effective, they often
introduce clearly mislabeled examples into the training data, and thus can be easily de-
tected by simple data filtering [53]. A recent clean-label (CL) attack proposed in [53]
disguises the backdoor pattern using adversarial perturbations (E in Fig. 1). The signal
(SIG) attack by Barni et al. [3] takes a superimposed sinusoidal signal as the backdoor
trigger. However, these backdoor attacks can be easily erased by defense methods, as
we will show in Sec. 4.4.
In this paper, we present a new type of backdoor pattern inspired by one natural phe-
nomenon: reflection. Reflection is a common phenomenon existing in scenarios wher-
ever there are glasses or smooth surfaces. Reflections often influence the performance
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Fig. 2. Real-world reflections (from ImageNet-a [24]) influence the performance of a DNN clas-
sifier. Labels in green and red colors are ground-truth and predicted labels respectively.
Table 1. Attack settings of existing methods and ours.
Badnets [21] Chen et al. [9] Barni et al. [3] Turner et al. [53] Ours
Label poison poison clean clean clean
Trainer adversary adversary user user user
Trigger fixed fixed sinusoidal signal fixed + adversarial reflection
of computer vision models [24], as illustrated in Fig. 2. Here, we exploit reflections as
backdoor patterns and show that a natural phenomenon like reflection can be manipu-
lated by an adversary to perform backdoor attack on DNN models. Table 1 compares
the different settings adopted by 4 state-of-the-art backdoor attacks and our proposed
reflection backdoor. Two examples of our proposed reflection backdoor are illustrated
in the rightmost column of Fig. 1. Our main contributions are:
– We investigate the use of a natural phenomenon, i.e., reflection, as the backdoor
pattern, and propose the reflection backdoor (Refool) attack to install stealthy and
effective backdoor into DNN models.
– We conduct experiments on 3 classification tasks, 5 datasets, and show that Re-
fool can control state-of-the-art DNNs to make desired predictions ≥75.16% of
the time by injecting reflections into less than 3.27% of the training data. More-
over, the injection causes almost no accuracy degradation on the clean holdout set.
– We demonstrate that, compared to the existing clean-label backdoor method, our
proposed Refool backdoor is more resistant to state–of-the-art backdoor defenses.
2 Related Work
We briefly review data poisoning and backdoor attacks as well as defenses for DNNs.
Data poisoning attack. The objective for data poisoning attack is to disrupt the proper
training of DNN models by reducing their test-time (not training-time) performance on
all or a specific subset of test samples [5,7,29,39,40,59]. DNNs trained on the poisoned
datasets suffer from low accuracy on normal test data. Although these attacks are ef-
fective, they are not particularly threatening in real-world scenarios. This is because
a classifier with poor performance is unlikely to be deployed, and this can be easily
detected via evaluation on a clean holdout set.
Backdoor attack. Different from data poisoning, a backdoor attack tricks the model to
associate a backdoor pattern with a specific target label, so that, whenever this pattern
appears, the model predicts the target label, otherwise, behaves normally. The backdoor
attack on DNNs was first explored in [21]. It was further characterized by having the
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following goals: 1) high attack success rate, 2) high backdoor stealthiness, and 3) low
performance impact on clean test data [35].
Poison-label backdoor attack. Several backdoor patterns have been proposed to in-
ject a backdoor by poisoning the images from the non-target classes and changing their
labels to the target class. For example, a small black-white square at one corner of the
image [21], an additional image attached onto or blended into the image [9], a fixed
watermark on the image [47], one fixed pixel on the image for low-resolution (32 ×
32) images. The backdoor trigger can also be implanted into the target model without
knowing the original training data. For example, Liu et al. [37] proposed a reverse en-
gineering method to generate a trigger pattern and a substitute input set, which are then
used to finetuning some layers of the network to implant the trigger. Recently, Yao et
al. [61] show that such backdoor attack can even be inherited via transfer-learning.
While the above methods can install backdoors into the victim model effectively, they
contain perceptually suspicious patterns and wrong labels, thus are susceptible to de-
tection or removal by simple data filtering [53]. Note that, although reverse engineering
does not require access to the training data which makes it stealthier, it still needs to
present the trigger pattern to activate the attack at test time.
Clean-label backdoor attack. Recently, Turner et al. [53] (CL) and Barni et al. [3]
(SIG) proposed the clean-label backdoor attack that can plant backdoor into DNNs
without altering the label. Zhao et al. [66] proposed a clean-label backdoor attack on
video recognition models. However, for clean-label backdoor patterns to be effective
against the filtering effect of deep cascade convolutions, it often requires more pertur-
bations that significantly reduce image quality, especially for high resolution images.
Furthermore, we also show empirically in Sec. 4 that these backdoor patterns can be
easily erased by backdoor defense methods. Different to these methods, in this paper,
we propose a natural reflection backdoor, which is stealthy, effective and hard to erase.
Backdoor attacks have also been found possible in federated learning [2,48,60] and
graph neural networks (GNNs) [65]. Latent backdoor patterns and properties of back-
door triggers have also been explored in recent works [32,33,41,62].
Backdoor defense. Defense techniques have also been developed to detect or erase
backdoor triggers from DNNs. Liu et al. [36] proposed a fine-pruning algorithm to
prune the abnormal units in a backdoored DNN. Wang et al. [55] proposed to use
anomaly index to detect backdoored models. Guo et al. [22] applied input pre-processing
techniques to denoise adversarial images. Zhang et al. [63] proposed a mixup training
scheme to increase DNN robustness against adversarial examples. Both the denoising
techniques and the mixup training can be directly applied to mitigate backdoor attacks.
Xiang et al. [58] proposed a cluster impurity based scheme to effectively detect single-
pixel backdoor attacks. Bagdasaryan et al. [2] developed a generic constrain-and-scale
technique that incorporates the evasion of defenses into the attackers loss function dur-
ing training. Chen et al. [8] proposed an activation clustering based method for back-
door detection and removal in DNNs. Doan et al. [12] presented Februus, which is a
plug-and-play defensive system architecture for backdoor defense. Gao et al. [18] pro-
posed a strong intentional perturbation (STRIP) based model to detect run-time back-
door attacks. We will evaluate the resistance of our proposed Refool attack to some of
the most effective defense methods.
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3 Reflection Backdoor Attack
In this section, we introduce the mathematical modeling of reflection and then proposed
reflection backdoor attack. Before that, we first define the problem of backdoor attack.
3.1 Problem definition
Given a K-class image dataset D = {(x, y)(i)}ni=1, with x ∈ X ⊂ Rd denoting a
sample in the d-dimensional input space and y ∈ Y = {1, · · · ,K} its true label, clas-
sification learns a function f(x,θ) (as represented by a DNN) with parameters θ to
map the input space to the label space: f : X → Y . We denote the subset of data
used for training and testing as Dtrain and Dtest respectively. The goal of a backdoor
attack is to install a backdoor into the victim model, so that the model will predict the
adversarial class yadv whenever the backdoor pattern presents on an input image. This
is done by first generating then injecting a backdoor pattern into a small injection set
Dinject ⊂ Dtrain of training examples (without changing their labels). In this clean-
label setting, Dinject is a subset of training examples from class yadv . We denote the
poisoned training set by Dadvtrain, and measure the injection rate by the percentage of
poisoned samples in Dadvtrain. The problem is how to generate effective backdoor pat-
terns. Next, we will introduce the use of natural reflection as the backdoor pattern.
(𝑘 = 𝛼)
(𝑘 = 𝑔)
(𝑘 = (𝛼, 𝛿))
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Fig. 3. The physical (left) and mathematical (right) models for three types of reflections. The
apple image is just for illustration purposes, when used for backdoor pattern, the reflection would
be crafted in a stealthier way by reducing xR ⊗ k.
3.2 Mathematical reflection modeling
Reflection occurs when taking a photo of objects behind a glass window. We denote a
clean background image by x, a reflection image by xR, and the reflection poisoned
image as xadv . Under reflection, the image formation process can be expressed as:
xadv = x+ xR ⊗ k, (1)
where k is a convolution kernel. The output of xR ⊗ k is referred to as the reflection.
We will use adversarial images generated in this way as backdoor attacks. According to
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the principle of camera imaging and the law of reflection, reflection models in physical
world scenarios can be divided into three categories [54], as illustrated in Fig. 3.
(I) Both layers are in the same depth of field (DOF). The main objects (blue circle)
behind the glass and the virtual image of reflections are in the same DOF, i.e., they are
approximately in the same focal plane. In this case, k in Eqn. (1) reduces to a intensity
number α, and we set α ∼ U [0.05, 0.4] in our experiments.
(II) Reflection layer is out of focus. It is reasonable to assume that the reflections (gray
triangles) and the objects (blue circle) behind the glass have different distances to the
camera [34], and the objects behind the glass is often focused (type (II) in Fig. 3). In
this case, the observed image xadv is an additive mixture of the background image and
the blurred reflections. The kernel k in Eqn. (1) depends on the point spread function
of the camera which is parameterized by a 2D Gaussian kernel g, i.e., g(|x − xc|) =
exp (−|x− xc|2/(2 ∗ σ)2), where xc is the center of kernel, and we set σ ∼ U [1, 5].
(III) Ghost effect. The above two types of reflections assume that the thickness of
the glass is tiny such that the refractive effect of the glass is negligible. However, this
is often not true in practice. It is thus also necessary to consider the thickness of the
glass. As illustrated in Fig. 3 (III), since the glass is semi-reflective, light rays from the
reflected objects (dark gray triangle) will reflect off the glass pane producing more than
one reflections — a ghost effect. In this case, the convolutional kernel k of Eqn. 1 can
be modelled as a two-pulse kernel k(α, δ), where δ is a spatial shift of α with different
coefficients. Empirically, we set α ∼ U [0.15, 0.35] and δ ∼ U [3, 8].
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Fig. 4. The training (top) and inference (bottom) procedures of our reflection backdoor attack.
3.3 Proposed reflection backdoor attack
Attack pipeline. The training and inference procedures of our proposed reflection back-
door Refool is illustrated in Fig. 4. The first step is reflection generation, which is to
generate backdoor images by adding reflections to clean images in the injection set
Dinject, following the 3 reflection models described in Sec. 3.2. The victim model is
then trained on the poisoned training set (e.g. Dadvtrain), which consists of an adversary
set of backdoor images (crafted at the first step) plus the clean images. At the inference
stage (bottom subfigure in Fig. 4), the reflection patterns can be blended into any input
image to achieve the target prediction.
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In contrast to existing methods that generate a fixed pattern, here, we propose to
generate a variety of reflections as the backdoor trigger. This is because reflection varies
from scene to scene in real-world scenarios. Using diverse reflections can help improve
the stealthiness of the attack.
Candidate reflection images from the wild. The candidate reflection images are not
restricted to the target dataset to attack, and can be selected from the wild, for example,
a public dataset. Even more, these reflection images can be used to invade a wide range
of target datasets (the datasets to attack) that consist of completely different types of
images, as we will show in the experiments (Sec. 4).
Assume the adversarial class is yadv and the adversary is allowed to inject m exam-
ples. We first create a candidate set of reflection images by selecting a set (more than
m) of images randomly from a public image dataset PascalVOC [14] and denote it by
Rcand. These reflection images are just normal images in the wild but from a dataset
that is different from the training dataset. The next step is to select the top-m most
effective reflection images from this candidate set for backdoor attack.
Adversarial reflection image selection. Not all reflection images are equally effective
for backdoor attack, because 1) when the reflection image is too small, it may be hard to
be planted as a backdoor trigger; and 2) when the intensity of the reflection image is too
strong, it will become less stealthy. Therefore, we propose an iterative selection process
to find the top-m most effective reflection images from Rcand as the adversarial reflec-
tion set Radv , only which will be used for the next step’s backdoor injection. To achieve
this, we maintain a list of effectiveness scores for reflection images in the candidate set
Rcand. We denote this effectiveness score list as W . The complete selection algorithm
is described in Algorithm 1. The selection process includes T iterations with each it-
eration consisting of 4 steps: 1) select the top-m most effective reflection images from
Rcand as the Radv , according to their effectiveness scores in W ; 2) inject the reflection
images in Radv into the injection set Dinject randomly following the reflection models
described in Sec. 3.2; 3) train a model on the poisoned training set; and 4) update the
effectiveness scores inW according to the model’s predictions on a validation setDval.
The validation set is not used for model training, and is randomly selected from Dtrain
after removing the yadv class samples. This is because a backdoor attack causes other
classes be misclassified into class yadv not the other way around, in other words, class
yadv samples are not useful for effectiveness evaluation here. For step 1), at the first it-
eration where the effectiveness scores are uniformly initialized with constant value one,
we just randomly select m reflection images from Rcand into the adversarial set Radv .
we empirically setm = 200 in our experiments. For step 2), each reflection imageRadv
is randomly injected into only one image in the injection set Dinject. For step 3), we
use a standard training strategy to train a model. Note that, the model trained in step 3)
is only used for reflection image selection, not the final victim model (see experimental
settings in Sec. 4). For step 4), the effectiveness scores in W are updated as follows:
Wi =
∑
xi
R
∈Radv,x∈Dval
{
1, if f(x+ xiR ⊗ k,θ) = yadv,
0, otherwise,
(2)
where, y is the class label of x, xiR is the i-th reflection image in Radv , and k is a
randomly selected kernel. For those reflection images not selected into Radv , we set
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their scores to the median value of the updated W . This is to increase their probability
of being selected in the next iteration.
The candidate set Rcand are selected out of a wild public dataset, and more impor-
tantly, the selection of Radv can be done on a dataset that is complete different from
the target dataset. We will show empirically in Sec. 4 that, once selected, reflection im-
ages in Radv can be directly applied to invade a wide range of datasets. This makes
our proposed reflection backdoor more malicious than many existing backdoor attacks
[21,9,53] that require access to the target datasets to generate or enhance their backdoor
patterns. We find that these reflection images even do not need any enhancements such
as adversarial perturbation [53] to achieve high attack success rates.
Algorithm 1: Adversarial reflection image selection
Input: Training set Dtrain, a candidate reflection set Rcand, validation set Dval, a DNN
model f , target class yadv , number of injected samples m, number of selection
iterations T
Output: Adversarial reflection set Radv
1 i← 0; W ← {1}size(Rcand) . a list of 1 with the size of Rcand
2 Radv ← random-m(Rcand) . random selection
3 while i ≤ T do
4 Dinject← randomly select m samples from Dtrain
5 Dadvtrain← inject Radv into Dinject using Eqn. (1)
6 fadv(x,θ)← train model on Dadvtrain
7 Wi← update effectiveness by Eqn. 2 for xiR ∈ Radv,x ∈ Dval
8 Wj ← median(W ) for xjR ∈ Rcand\Radv
9 Radv ← top-m(Rcand,W ) . top m selection
10 end
11 return Radv
Attack with reflection images (Backdoor Injection). The above step will produce a
set of effective reflection imagesRadv , which can then be injected into the target dataset
by poisoning a small portion of the data from the target class (clean-label attack only
needs to poison data from the target class). Note that, although the selection of Radv
does not require access to the target dataset, the attack still needs to inject the backdoor
pattern into training data, which is an essential step for any backdoor attacks.
Given a clean image from the target class, we randomly select one reflection image
from Radv , then use one of the 3 reflection models introduced in Section 3.2 to fuse
the reflection image into the clean image. This injection process is iteratively done
until a certain proportion of the target class images are contaminated with reflections.
The victim model will remember the reflection backdoor when trained on the poisoned
training set using a classification loss such as the commonly used cross entropy loss:
θ = argmin
θ
− 1
n
∑
xi∈Dadvtrain
K∑
j=1
yij log(p(j|xi,θ)), (3)
where, xi is the i-th training sample, yij is the class indicator of xi belonging to class
j, and p(j|xi,θ) is the model’s probability output with respect to class j conditioned
on the input xi, and current parameter θ. We denote the learned victim model as fadv .
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Inference and attack. At the inference stage, the model is expected to correctly pre-
dict the clean samples (i.e.fadv(x,θ) = y for any test input x ∈ Dtest). However,
it consistently predicts the adversarial class for any input that contains a reflection:
fadv(x + xR ⊗ k,θ) = yadv for any test input x ∈ Dtest and reflection image
xR ∈ Radv . The attack success rate is measured by the percentage of test samples
that are predicted as the target class yadv , after adding reflections.
4 Experiments
In this section, we first evaluate the effectiveness and stealthiness of our Refool attack,
then provide a comprehensive understanding of Refool. We also test the resistance of
our Refool attack to state-of-the-art backdoor defense methods.
4.1 Experimental setup
Datasets and DNNs. We consider 3 image classification tasks: 1) traffic sign recogni-
tion, 2) face recognition, and 3) object classification. For traffic sign recognition, we
use 3 datasets: GTSRB [46], BelgiumTSC [51] and CTSRD [26]. For the 3 traffic sign
datasets, we remove those low-resolution images of height or width smaller than 100
pixels. Then, we augment the training set using random crop and rotation, as [43]. For
face recognition, we use the PubFig [30] dataset with extracted face regions, which is
also augmented using random crop and rotation. For object classification, we randomly
sample a subset of 12 classes of images from ImageNet [11]. We use ResNet-34 [23]
for traffic sign recognition and face recognition. While for object classification, we con-
sider two different DNN models: ResNet-34 and DenseNet [25]. The statistics of the
datasets and DNN models can be found in Appendix A.
Attack setting. For all datasets, we set the adversarial target class to the first class
(i.e., class id 0), and randomly select clean training samples from the target class as
the injection set Dinject under various injection rates. The adversarial reflection set
Radv is generated based on the GTSRB dataset, following the algorithm described in
Sec. 3.3. We randomly choose a small number of 5000 images from PascalVOC [14]
as the candidate reflection set Rcand, and 100 training samples from each of the non-
target classes as the validation setDval, for adversarial reflection image selection. Once
selected, Radv is directly applied to all other datasets, that is, these reflection images
selected based on one single dataset can be effectively applied to invade a wide range
of other datasets. The adversarial reflection images are selected against a ResNet-34
model. When injecting a reflection image into a clean image, we randomly choose one
of the 3 reflection models described in Eqn. (1), but we also test using fixed reflection
models. When applying the attack at the inference stage, the reflection images from
Radv are randomly injected into the clean test images.
DNN training. All DNN models are trained using Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD)
optimizer with momentum 0.9, weight decay of 5e-4, and an initial learning rate 0.01,
which is divided by 10 for every 105 training steps. We use batch size 32 and train all
models for 200 epochs. All images are normalized to [0, 1].
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Table 2. Attack success rates (%) of baselines and our proposed Refool backdoor, and the victim
model’s test accuracy (%) on the clean test set. The “original test accuray” is the test accuracy
of the same model but trained on the original clean data. † denotes the model is replaced by a
DenseNet. Note that we are poisoning 20% images in the target classes, the injection rate (%) is
computed with respect to the entire dataset.
Dataset
Original
test acc.
Test accuracy (%) Attack success rate (%) Injection
rate (%)Badnets CL SIG Refool Badnets CL SIG Refool
GTSRB 87.40 83.33 84.61 82.64 86.30 24.12 78.03 73.26 91.67 3.16
BelgiumTSC 99.89 99.70 97.56 99.13 99.51 11.40 46.25 51.89 85.70 2.31
CTSRD 97.11 90.00 94.44 93.97 95.01 25.24 63.63 57.39 91.70 0.91
PubFig 91.31 91.67 78.50 91.70 91.12 42.86 78.67 69.01 81.30 0.57
ImageNet 91.78 91.97 92.07 91.41 90.32 15.77 55.38 63.84 82.11 3.27
ImageNet† 93.01 91.99 92.12 92.23 92.63 20.14 67.43 68.00 75.16 3.27
4.2 Effectiveness and stealthiness of our Refool attack
Attack success rate comparison. Here, we compare our Refool attack with three state-
of-the-art backdoor attacks: Badnets [21], clean-label backdoor (CL) [53], and signal
backdoor (SIG) [3]. We use the default settings as reported in their papers (implementa-
tion details can be found in Appendix A). The attack success rates and the correspond-
ing injection rates on the 5 datasets are reported in Table 2. We also report the test
accuracy of the victim model on the clean test set, and the “original test accuracy” for
models trained on the original clean data.
As shown in Table 2, by poisoning only a small proportion of the training data,
our proposed Refool attack can successfully invade the state-of-the-art DNN models,
achieving higher success rates than existing backdoor attacks. With lower than 3.27%
injection rate, Refool can reach a high attack success rate> 75% across the five datasets
and different networks (e.g. ResNet and DenseNet). Meanwhile, the victim models
still perform well on clean test data, with less than 3% accuracy decrease (compared
to the original accuracies) across all test scenarios. On some datasets, take CTSRD for
example, one only needs to contaminate < 1% of training data to successfully control
the model over 91% of the time. We further show, in Fig. 5, the prediction confusion
matrix of the victim model on GTSRD dataset. We see the victim model can correctly
predict the clean images most of the time, yet can be controlled to only predict the target
class (e.g. class 0, more results on other target classes are reported in Appendix B) when
reflections are added to the test images, a clear demonstration of successful backdoor
attack. These results show that natural phenomena like reflection can be manipulated as
a backdoor pattern to attack DNNs. Considering that reflection backdoors are visually
very similar to natural reflections which commonly exist in the real world, this poses a
new type of threat to deep learning models.
Stealthiness comparison. We show in Fig. 7 an example of the backdoored images
crafted to attack the CTSRD dataset. We compute the mean square error (MSE) and
L2 distances between the original image and the backdoored image crafted by CL, SIG
and our Refool backdoor attacks. As shown in this example, our reflection attack is
stealthier in terms of smooth surface and hidden shadows. More visual inspections and
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Fig. 5. The prediction confusion matrix of the victim model trained on GTSRB dataset with only
3.16% training data poisoned by our Refool attack. Left: predictions on clean test images. Right:
predictions on test images with reflections.
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Fig. 6. Left: Attack success rate and test accuracy versus in-class (the target class) injection rate.
Right: The attack success rate on class 3, 4, and 11, and the model’s test accuracy, over iterations
of our reflection generation process. These experiments were run on GTSRB dataset.
the average distortions (e.g. MSE and L2 distances) over 500 randomly backdoored
images can be found in Appendix C.
Original image CL SIG Refool (Ours)
MSE: 331          L2: 145 MSE: 195          L2: 147 MSE: 73 L2: 114
Fig. 7. Stealthiness of CL [53] and SIG [3] and our Refool : MSE and L2 distances between the
original image and the backdoor image are shown at the top corners of the backdoor images.
Attack success rate versus injection rate. We next show, on the GTSRB dataset, how
different injection rates influence the attack success rate of CL and our Refool attacks.
As shown in left of Fig. 6, we vary the in-class injection rate from [0, 0.8] with interval
0.1. The corresponding injection rate with respect to the entire dataset is only 0.032,
0.063, 0.126 for in-class injection rate 0.2, 0.4, 0.8 respectively. Poisoning more data
can steadily improve attack success rate until 40% of the data in target class are poi-
soned, after which, the attack stabilizes. Our Refool attack outperforms the CL attack
under all injection rates. Note that increasing injection rate only has minimal impact on
the model’s accuracy on clean examples.
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Fig. 8. Understandings of Refool with Grad-CAM [43] with two samples from PubFig(left) and
GTSRB(right). In each group, the images at the top are the original input, CL [53], SIG [3] and
our Refool (left to right), while images at the bottom are their corresponding attention maps.
4.3 Understandings of our reflection backdoor attack
Efficiency of adversarial reflection image selection. Here, we evaluate the efficiency
of our adversarial reflection image selection in Algorithm 1). We test the attack effec-
tiveness of the adversarial reflection images (e.g. Radv) selected at each iteration for
a total of 14 (0 - 13) iterations, on GTSRB dataset. The attack success rate on three
classes and the model’s test accuracy are shown in the right of Fig. 6. For each of the
3 tested classes (e.g. class 3, 4 and 11), we inject reflection images generated at the
current iteration randomly into the clean test images of the class. We then measure the
class-wise attack success rate. In detail, we record the proportion of examples in the
class (after injection) that are predicted by the current model as the target class 0. The
proposed generation algorithm can find effective reflections efficiently within 9 itera-
tions. Note that, once these adversarial reflections are found, they can be applied to
install backdoor into any DNN models that are trained on the dataset, as we have shown
with the ResNet/DenseNet models on ImageNet dataset in Table 2.
Performance under different reflection models. We then show how the 3 types of re-
flections introduced in Sec. 3.2 influence the attack success rate. The experiments were
also conducted on the GTSRB dataset. The adversarial reflection images (e.g. Radv)
used here are the same as those selected for previous experiments. The difference here
is that we test 2 different injection strategies: 1) using fixed reflection, or 2) using ran-
domly mixed reflections (as was used in previous experiments). We also measure the
average similarity of training images (4772 in total) before and after injection, using 3
popular similarity metrics: peak-signal-to-noise-ratio (PSNR) [27], structural similar-
ity index (SSIM) [56] and mean square error (MSE). The numeric results are reported
in Table 4.3. In terms of attack success rate and test accuracy, type (II) and type (III)
demonstrate higher attack success rate with less model corruption (higher test accuracy)
than type (I) reflection. When combined, the three types of reflection achieved the best
attack success rate and least model corruption (highest test accuracy). It was also ob-
served that type (II) injection has the minimum distortion (e.g. highest SSIM/PSNR
and lowest MSE) to the original data, while type (III) reflection causes the largest dis-
tortion, as a consequence of the ghost effect (see Fig. 3). The relatively small distortion
of type (II) reflection is due to its smoothness effect. Overall, a random mixture of the
three reflections yields the best attack strength with moderate distortion.
Effect of reflection trigger on network attention. We further investigate how reflec-
tion backdoor affects the attention of the network. Visual inspections on a few exam-
ples are shown in Fig. 8. The attention maps are computed using the Gradient-weighted
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Table 3. Attack success rate versus test accuracy for different types of reflection models.
Reflection Attack Test Similarity
type success rate Accuracy SSIM PSNR MSE
(I) 87.30% 83.59% 0.883 26.68 62.11
(II) 90.46% 85.00% 0.896 27.45 60.54
(III) 90.33% 85.63% 0.786 23.01 95.87
Mix 91.67% 86.30% 0.828 24.98 73.44
Class Activation Mapping (Grad-CAM) technique [43], which finds the critical regions
in the input images that mostly activate the victim model’s output. We find that the
reflection backdoor only slightly shifts the model’s attention off the correct regions,
whereas CL and SIG significantly shift the model’s attention either completely off the
target or in a striped manner, especially in the traffic sign example. This suggests the
stealthiness of our reflection backdoor from a different perspective.
4.4 Resistance to state-of-the-art backdoor defenses
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Fig. 9. Left: Attack success rates during finetuning on clean data. Middle: Test accuracy (on
clean inputs) and attack success rate against the neural pruning defense. These experiments were
run on GTSRB dataset. Right: Backdoor detection using Neural Cleanse [55]. Anomaly index >
2 indicates a detected backdoored model.
Resistance to finetuning. We compare the our Refool to CL [53] and SIG [3], in
terms of the resistance to clean-data-based finetuning [55,36]. We train a victim model
on GTSRB dataset separately under the three attacks, while leaving 10% of the clean
training data out as the finetuning set. We then fine-tune the model on the finetuning set
for 20 epochs using the same SGD optimizer but smaller learning rate 0.0001. We fix the
shallow layers of the network and only fine-tune the last dense layer. The comparison
results are illustrated in the left of Fig. 9. As can be seen, the attack success rate of CL
drops from 78.3% to 20% after just one epoch of finetuning and SIG drops from 73.0%
to 25% after 4 epochs, while our Refool attack is still above 60% after 15 epochs. The
reason why is that reflections are a natural and fundamental type of feature, rather than
random patterns that can be easily erased by finetuning on clean data.
Resistance to neural pruning. We then test the resistance of the three attacks to the
state-of-the-art backdoor defense method Fine-pruning [36] (experimental settings are
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Table 4. The attack success rate (%) before/after white-box trigger removal on GTSRB dataset.
Badnets [21] CL [53] SIG [3] Refool
Before 24.12 78.03 73.26 91.67
After 15.38 H 8.74 18.18 H 59.85 17.29 H 55.97 85.01 H 6.65
in Appendix D). The comparison results are shown in the middle subfigure of Fig. 9.
The attack success rate of CL drops drastically from 76% to 8.3% when 60% of neurons
are removed, while SIG drops from 73% to 16.5% when 50% of neurons are removed.
Compared to CL or SIG, our reflection backdoor is more resistance to neural pruning,
with much higher success rates until 80% of neurons are removed.
Resistance to neural cleanse. Neural Cleanse [55] detects whether a trained model has
been planted backdoor, in which case it assumes the training samples will require mini-
mal modifications to be manipulated by the attacker. Here, we apply Neural Cleanse to
detect a backdoored ResNet-34 model by our Refool on GTSRB dataset. As shown in
the right subfigure of Fig. 9, Neural Cleanse fails to detect the backdoored model, i.e.,
anomaly index < 2. More results on other datasets can be found in Appendix D.
Resistance to white-box trigger removal. Here, we apply trigger removal methods for
different backdoor attacks in a white-box setting (the defender has identified the trigger
pattern). For our Refool , we adopt a state-of-the-art reflection removal method [64] to
clean the poisoned data. For Badnets, we simply replace the value of the trigger by the
mean pixel value of their three adjacent patches. For CL, we use the non-Local means
denoising technique [6]. For SIG, we add −v(i, j) (defined in Eqn. (4) in Appendix D)
to backdoored images to remove the trigger. The attack success rates before and after
trigger removal are reported in Table 4.4. Existing attacks Badnets, CL, and SIG rely
on fixed backdoor patterns, thus can be easily removed by white-box trigger removal
methods, i.e., success rate drops to < 20%. Conversely, our Refool uses reflection
images randomly selected from the wild, thus can still maintain a high success rate of
85% after reflection removal. Overall, we believe backdoor attack is still a challenging
task to successfully attack a model while evade white-box trigger removal. Detailed
experimental settings and more results on other defenses including input denoising and
mixup data augmentation can be found in Appendix D.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the natural phenomenon of reflection, for use in back-
door attack on DNNs. Based on mathematical modeling of physical reflection models,
we proposed the reflection backdoor (Refool ) approach. Refool plants a backdoor into
a victim model by generating and injecting reflections into a small set of training data.
Empirical results across 3 computer vision tasks and 5 datasets demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of Refool. It can attack state-of-the-art DNNs with high success rate and
small degradation in accuracy. Reflection backdoors can be generated efficiently, and
are resistant to state-of-the-art defense methods. Our work surprisingly demonstrates
that even natural features can be exploited as backdoors to manipulate DNNs. It is an
open question as to whether new types of training strategies can be developed that are
robust to this kind of natural backdoors.
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A More implementation details
The statistics of the datasets and DNN models used in our experiments are summarized
in Table A.
Table A. Statistics of image datasets and DNN models used in our experiments.
Task Dataset # Labels
# Input
Size
# Training
Images
DNN
model
Traffic GTSRB 13 224×224 4772 ResNet-34
Sign BelgiumTSC 11 224×224 3556 ResNet-34
Recognition CTSRD 22 224×224 2028 ResNet-34
Face
Recognition
PubFig 60 300×300 5181 ResNet-34
Object
Classification
ImageNet
subset
12 300×300 12406 ResNet-34
DenseNet-121
Detailed implementation of baselines. There are two baselines for our experiments.
For clean-label attack (CL) et al. [53], we use the same settings as reported in their
paper. Specifically, we use Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) adversarial perturbation
bounded to L∞ maximum perturbation =16. For SIG [3], Backdoored image are gen-
erated with horizontal sinusoidal signal defined by
v(i, j) = ∆sin(2pijf/m), 1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, (4)
where f is a certain frequency, we follow [3] and set ∆ = 20 and f = 6.
B Results on more target classes
We run more experiments with different target classes (e.g.class indexes 1, 2, 3, 4)
on GTSRB dataset. The test accuracy and attack success rate are reported in Table B.
While there are some variations, the overall results of our Refool attack are consistent
over different target classes.
C More quantitative results for stealthiness comparison
By randomly selecting 500 images from CTSRD, we conduct a quantitative comparison
of the stealthiness between our Refool and the baselines CL [53] and SIG [3]. The
average L2, L1 distances and Mean Square Error (MSE) between the original images
and their backdoored versions are reported in Table C. The distortions of our Refool are
much lower than either CL or SIG, indicating higher stealthiness. This is further verified
by more visual inspections on some randomly selected examples in Fig. 1.
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Table B. Attack success rate and test accuracy (on clean test samples) of our Refool attack on
different target classes of the GTSRB dataset.
Class ID Test accuracy Attack success rate
0 86.30% 91.67%
1 81.75% 87.98%
2 85.48% 89.74%
3 85.75% 90.83%
4 81.29% 91.81%
Table C. The average distortions (measured by L2, L1 and MSE distances) made by different
backdoor attacks on 500 randomly selected clean training images.
CL [53] SIG [3] Refool
L2 norm 145.15 147.13 113.67
L1 norm 119.65 125.50 72.06
MSE 273.73 201.55 75.30
D More results against state-of-the-art backdoor defenses
White-box trigger removal. For Fine-Pruning [36], we replicate the Fine-pruning via
PyTorch [1] and prune the last convolutional layer (i.e., layer4.2.conv2) of the
DNNs. In terms of white-box trigger removal, for our Refool, we adopt a state-of-the-
art reflection removal method [64]. For Badnets [21], we simply replace the value of
the trigger by the mean pixel value of their three adjacent patches. For CL et al. [53],
we use the non-Local means denoising technique [6]. For SIG [3], we add the −v(i, j)
defined in Eqn. (4) on backdoored image back to the backdoor image to remove the
trigger pattern. We apply trigger removal on the poisoned training data, then retrain the
model under the same condition for all the other four datasets: BelgiumTSC, CTSRD,
PubFig, and ImageNet. As shown in Table D, our Refool maintains a much higher
success rate after trigger removal than either CL or SIG across all datasets. We notice
that Refool also exhibits an obvious success rate drop on ImageNet datasets. We suspect
this is caused by the large amount of natural noise exists in ImageNet images. These
natural noise tends to affect the effectiveness of all backdoor patterns, and also increase
the possibility for them to be removed. We believe that, for our attack, this can be
addressed by simply increasing the intensity of the reflection. A more adaptive reflection
backdoor to this situation is an interesting future work.
Neural Cleanse detection. Fig. 2 illustrates more results of Refool backdoored models
against Neural Cleanse detection on datasets BelgiumTSC, CTSRD, PubFig and Ima-
geNet. None of the four backdoored models by our Refool can be detected by Neural
Cleanse. Note that only an anomaly index > 2 indicates a successful detection.
Input denoising or data augmentation based defenses. We further evaluated the resis-
tance of our Refool attack to input denoising methods on CTSRD dataset. Specifically,
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Fig. 1. More visual inspections for the stealthiness of CL [53], SIG [3] and our Refool.
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Fig. 2. More results of Neural Cleanse on five datasets.
we consider denoising techniques from Guo et al. [22]: image quilting, Total Variation
denoising (TV denoise), JPEG compression, and Pixel quantization. We also include
the data augmentation based mixup defense in [63]. These denoising or augmentation
defenses are mostly proposed for adversarial attacks, but can be directly applied to back-
door attacks. We apply the denoising methods on all test samples (both backdoored and
non-backdoored), and report the model’s performance on denoised samples. For mixup,
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Table D. The attack success rate (%) of different backdoor attacks before or after white-box
trigger removal.
Dataset Badnets [21] CL [53] SIG [3] Ours
before after before after before after before after
BelgiumTSC 11.40 0.75 46.25 8.33 51.86 0.88 85.70 77.78
CTSRD 25.24 7.23 63.63 11.52 57.39 6.10 91.70 83.09
PubFig 42.86 13.33 78.67 31.74 69.01 8.34 81.30 68.42
ImageNet+ResNet 15.77 8.98 55.38 17.69 63.84 8.45 82.11 36.93
ImageNet+DenseNet 20.14 7.32 67.43 12.93 68.00 7.37 75.16 28.07
Table D. The resistance of our Refool attack to input denoising or data augmentation defenses
on CTSRD dataset
Methods Test accuracy (%) Attack success accuracy (%)
Refool (proposed) 86.30 91.67
Quilting 11.35 89.09
TV denoise 85.43 89.84
JPEG compression 86.57 90.98
Pixel quantization 86.30 91.01
Mixup 87.79 87.08
Reflection removal 86.41 85.01
we retrain the network on the backdoored training set with its default setting. As shown
in Table D, these denoising or augmentation methods indeed can decrease the attack
success rate for 4%. However, they are less effective than defenses like fine-tuning or
trigger (e.g. reflection) removal. And image quilting seems greatly decrease the model’s
performance on clean samples, i.e., test accuracy drops from 86.30% to 11.35%.
